Research
How to distinguish human error from election fraud: Evidence from the 2019 Malawi election
with Ryan Jablonski (forthcoming)
Abstract
Voters and politicians often blame tallying irregularities on fraud, undermining perceptions of democratic and electoral credibility. Yet such irregularities also result from capacity failures and human error. We introduce several methods to assess competing causes of tallying irregularities leveraging the quasi-random administration of polling stations. Using these methods, we revisit the case of the 2019 Malawian presidential election which was famously cancelled by the High Court due to widespread tallying irregularities and accusations of fraud. Contrary to the dominant consensus, we do not find evidence that irregularities were motivated by fraud or that they benefited the incumbent. Instead, we show that irregularities increased in proportion to the complexity of filling in result-sheets, suggesting a dominant role for human error. In addition to reinterpreting a historically important election, we also make the case that policy efforts to improve electoral credibility could productively be reallocated towards electoral administration rather than anti-fraud measures.
Building confidence in election results: lessons from a conjoint experiment
with Alex Yeandle (funded project)
Abstract
Amidst growing concern about disinformation in elections, public faith in official election results have never felt more important. From the US to Brazil to the DRC, results are regularly challenged in court and their legitimacy called into question, placing increasing importance on how elections are administered and how voters’ confidence in them can be ensured. Such interventions – like polling staff training, the presence of monitors, and transparency of election results – have been found to reduce “objective” electoral irregularities in many countries. Yet, we know little about how these shape “subjective” judgements by voters themselves, and if they enhance trust in the legitimacy of elections. We carry out a conjoint choice experiment in Malawi to address this question. In our experiment, respondents are presented with pairs of polling station profiles, containing randomised information about the home-region (and presumed loyalties) of presiding officers, level of education of polling station staff, the presence and type of election monitors and party representatives, and transparency measures in place. Respondents are then asked to select the polling stations they think deliver more trustworthy results.
Foreign aid is neither a curse nor a blessing: Explaining the effect of foreign aid on voting behaviour and accountability
with Ryan Jablonski and Brigitte Seim (forthcoming)
Abstract
How does foreign aid affect elections? To reconcile mixed evidence, we re-conceptualize the effect of aid on elections as a retrospective voting problem and show that the electoral effects of foreign aid are heterogeneous and depend on the distribution of aid and voter beliefs. To test our argument, we conducted a survey among 2,331 citizens around a sample of 180 schools in Malawi before and after the delivery of a foreign NGO project. Additionally, we conducted a SMS-based information experiment which varied voter knowledge about the aid allocation process. In line with expectations, voters who benefit from aid are more likely to anticipate voting for incumbents. But overall aid was a mixed blessing for incumbents: when citizens learn about aid, but fail to benefit, we document a sizable backlash against incumbents. Citizens were less likely to be satisfied with or vote for incumbents.
with Brigitte Seim and Ryan Jablonski, Journal of Development Economics, September 2020
Abstract
Does foreign aid shift public spending? Many worry that aid will be “fungible” in the sense that governments reallocate public funds in response to aid. If so, this could undermine development, increase the poorest's dependency on donors, and free resources for patronage. Yet, there is little agreement about the scale or consequences of such effects. We conducted an experiment with 460 elected politicians in Malawi. We provided information about foreign aid projects in local schools to these politicians. Afterwards, politicians made real decisions about which schools to target with development goods. Politicians who received the aid information treatment were 18% less likely to target schools with existing aid. These effects increase to 22–29% when the information was plausibly novel. We find little evidence that aid information heightens targeting of political supporters or family members, or dampens support to the neediest. Instead the evidence indicates politicians allocate the development goods in line with equity concerns.
Please find the full article here.